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Abstract: Public sector organizations face regular turnover in top leadership positions. Yet little is known about 
how such changes affect staff attitudes. The authors argue that top leader succession may influence staff attitudes, 
particularly when new leaders are “outsiders” and/or subordinates interact regularly with their leaders. Using a unique 
two-wave survey conducted within the European Commission in 2008 and 2014, this analysis tests these propositions 
by studying the same individuals before and after shifts in top political (commissioner) and administrative (director-
general) positions. The study shows that leadership succession can trigger meaningful shifts in subordinates’ stated 
attitudes regarding the European Commission’s supranational identity. These findings are important because staff 
attitudes about organizational values and aims represent a key driver of individual and organizational performance.
Evidence for Practice
• Top leader succession affects staff attitudes in public sector organizations, which can influence individual and 
organizational performance.
• Accounting for leader succession’s impact on staff is more important when leader-subordinate distance is 
smaller and contacts more frequent.
• When planning leadership succession, public sector organizations should pay close attention to candidates’ 
value (in)congruence with outgoing leaders.
• Public sector organizations should invest in (non)verbal messages to staff to increase the salience of positive 
differences between old and new leaders.
The role and importance of leadership in public sector organizations has attracted significant research since the pathbreaking work of 
Selznick (1957). Numerous studies have explored 
the nature and scope conditions linking leader 
characteristics and leadership styles to public sector 
performance (Jacobsen and Andersen 2015; Javidan 
and Waldman 2003; Tummers and Knies 2013; for 
a review, see Van Wart 2013), job satisfaction (Kim 
2002), reform implementation (Moynihan, Pandey, 
and Wright 2012), and innovative behavior (Miao et 
al. 2018). Other scholars have also investigated when 
and how leaders’ background characteristics relate to 
management styles within their units (Kassim et al. 
2013). In sharp contrast, few studies have assessed 
the individual-level mechanisms underlying leaders’ 
alleged performance effects (Zhao et al. 2016) or 
the influence of leader successions in public sector 
organizations (Murdoch et al. 2019). Our analysis 
aims to bridge these research gaps. Specifically, we 
build on research on leader and follower identity 
dynamics to argue that top leader succession impacts 
individuals’ attitudes about an organization’s core aims 
and values. This is an important question, as such 
attitudes represent a central driver of individual and 
organizational performance (Pratt et al. 2016).
Our theoretical argument starts from the common 
notion that individuals “hold on to multiple 
identities that are organized in a flexible and dynamic 
hierarchical structure of salience” (Epitropaki et al. 
2017, 110). As first proposed by Lord and Brown 
(2001, 2004), top leaders may affect the relative 
salience of subordinates’ multiple identities because 
they activate a distinct portion of subordinates’ 
self-concept through their rhetoric, actions, and 
characteristics. Similar shifts in subordinates’ identity 
salience hierarchy would also arise when the actions 
or positions of a new leader extend subordinates’ 
set of identities. We argue that these changes in the 
relative salience of multiple identities can invoke 
observable shifts in individuals’ attitudes regarding 
their organization’s core values.
Clearly, top leader successions might trigger 
such attitudinal implications only under specific 
conditions. We concentrate on two moderating 
factors. First, a larger distance between leaders and 
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subordinates has been argued to mitigate the influence that leaders 
have (Bass 1990; Moon and Park 2019). This arises because close 
leaders have more contact with subordinates (Gumusluoglu, 
Karakitapoğlu-Aygün, and Hirst 2013; Kassim et al. 2013; 
Murdoch and Trondal 2013), and proximity allows for higher-
quality communication (Avolio et al. 2004; Kelloway et al. 2003) 
as well as increased opportunities to convey expectations and 
provide coaching (Gittell 2001; Howell, Neufeld, and Avolio 2005). 
Leadership succession is therefore expected to have a stronger 
impact on subordinates within a closer distance to the leader. 
Second, evidence suggests that outsider succession is more likely 
to “trigger both cognitive and emotional reactions from followers” 
because outsiders pose a sharper contrast to, and break with, the 
past (Epitropaki et al. 2017, 121; see also Kunisch et al. 2017). 
Although any diverging impact of outsider versus insider succession 
on organizational performance remains hotly debated (Giambatista, 
Rowe, and Riaz 2005; Schepker et al. 2017), its potential role as a 
moderator of subordinates’ attitudinal responses to leader succession 
is included in this study as a central part of the research design.1
In the empirical analysis, we assess these propositions by comparing 
the same staff members across two waves of a large-scale survey 
conducted within the European Commission in 2008 and 2014. 
The dependent variable is staff members’ stated attitude with respect 
to the Commission’s strong and widely acknowledged supranational 
identity (Connolly and Kassim 2017; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012; 
Hooghe 2005). Identification of leader succession effects derives 
from variation in Commission staff ’s exposure to changes in top 
leader positions over the period of analysis. Since the majority of 
staff have no influence over who becomes their new boss, changes 
in top leadership are exogenous to staff working in the affected 
directorates. We exploit this key characteristic in a difference-in-
differences research design to identify causal effects.
Our main findings corroborate that top leader succession can trigger 
substantively meaningful changes in Commission staff ’s stated attitudes 
regarding the Commission’s supranational identity. These effects are 
strongest when top leader succession involves individuals from outside 
the organization or from institutions with attitudes known to diverge 
from those of the incumbent leader (“outsiders”). Furthermore, 
the effects are most pronounced when leader-subordinate distance 
is smaller and contacts are more frequent. These findings have 
important implications for public sector governance since staff 
attitudes toward an organization’s core values are a central driver of 
individual and organizational performance. These have been linked 
to outcomes including job satisfaction, individual well-being, and 
policy preferences (Kuehnhanss et al. 2017; Pratt et al. 2016), which 
are all antecedents of performance. Hence, our results improve our 
understanding of the individual-level mechanisms underlying leaders’ 
oft-studied performance effects (e.g., Javidan and Waldman 2003; 
Jacobsen and Andersen 2015) while emphasizing that “leadership 
matters”—also in the public sector.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Recent research has argued that psychological processes related to 
one’s identity may be central to how leaders affect subordinates’ 
behavior and attitudes (Epitropaki et al. 2017; Lord et al. 2017). 
The core idea is that the “refinement of one’s identity is an ongoing 
and central aspect of organizational membership that depends, in 
part, on the relationship with one’s supervisor” (Lord, Gatti, and 
Chui 2016, 125). Leaders thus are believed to have the capability 
to produce both short- and long-term changes in subordinates by 
influencing—through their rhetoric, actions, and characteristics—
the relative salience of different aspects of subordinates’ self-
concepts. In doing so, leaders are able to affect the behavior and 
attitudes of their subordinates (Lord and Brown 2001, 2004).
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify three key concepts—
and their relationship—at the heart of this theoretical framework: 
identity, self-concept, and attitudes. An individual’s (personal) 
identity can be defined as “a set of physical, psychological, and 
interpersonal characteristics” as well as “a range of affiliations (e.g., 
ethnicity) and social roles” that are “not wholly shared with any 
other person” (https://dictionary.apa.org/identity). An individual’s 
self-concept refers to one’s “mental model” of the self as constructed 
from beliefs that one holds about oneself. Finally, attitudes are 
evaluations—either positive, negative, or ambiguous—about a 
particular object. Extensive research in psychology indicates that 
attitudes are closely linked to identities and self-concept by being 
one of the ways in which individuals express their sense of self (to 
themselves and others).
Building on such insights—as well as the notion that individuals’ 
multiple identities exist “in a hierarchy of salience” (Stryker 1968, 
560; see also Epitropaki et al. 2017)—we argue that leader succession 
may induce changes in individuals’ identity hierarchy. This can 
arise either because leaders with distinct styles, rhetorical skills, 
attitudes, and beliefs prime or inhibit specific, preexisting aspects 
of the self or because leaders are able to extend the set of available 
aspects within subordinates’ self-concept. Independent of whether 
we assume that the set of aspects within subordinates’ self-concept is 
fixed or malleable, the key point is that leader succession may activate 
different aspects of subordinates’ self-concept. This shift comes about 
for two main reasons. On the one hand, leaders’ (non)verbal messages 
have relevance for subordinates’ sensemaking within organizations 
(van Knippenberg and Hogg 2003; Weick 1995). On the other hand, 
humans’ need for belonging (Baumeister and Leary 1995) makes 
them keen to assimilate by incorporating (parts of ) the selves of 
significant others—such as leaders in an organizational context—into 
the self. Both elements entail that new leaders might influence which 
aspects of the self become active or are added. This, in turn, may 
prompt observable shifts in subordinates’ attitudes, including their 
position relative to an organization’s core values and aims.
In the context of leader succession, this line of argument is 
substantiated by the fact that identity work is most prominent 
during transition stages (Ashforth 2000; Ibarra and Barbulescu 
2010). Transitions from one organization, role, or leader to another 
impose distinct normative expectations on individuals (Mainemelis, 
Kark, and Epitropaki 2015; Nicholson 1984). Such instability 
can undermine people’s sense of who they are and induce self-
uncertainty (Hogg 2015). The desire to resolve this uncertainty 
represents a powerful driver for change during transitions. New 
leaders thus are likely to provide vital and decisive role models in 
subordinates’ search to reduce uncertainty during transition stages.
Even so, it remains unclear a priori whether leader succession 
induces shifts in subordinates’ attitudes toward or away from 
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the perceived position of a new leader (e.g., with respect to the 
organization’s core values and aims). Subordinates who had a good 
relationship with the previous leader might oppose the new leader 
and take dissenting positions (a contrast effect). Others might be 
more prone to ingratiating activities “for the purpose of altering 
(shaping) positively the evaluations or attributions of relevant 
others” (Liden and Mitchell 1988, 572; see also Ralston 1985), 
triggering opinion conformity with the new leader (an alignment 
effect). We treat the presence and direction of these shifts as an 
empirical issue and formulate the following general hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Top leader succession activates changes in staff 
members’ expressed attitudes with respect to an organization’s 
core values.
Clearly, top leader successions need not always trigger responses 
within subordinates. The context and characteristics of successions 
can moderate their impact. One such moderating factor is the 
distance between leaders and subordinates, which affects leaders’ 
ability to influence subordinates’ performance (Moon and Park 
2019; Neufeld, Wan, and Fang 2010). Distance may thereby 
exist in several dimensions—spatial, social, and temporal—that 
are “cognitively related to each other” (Trope and Liberman 
2010, 440). In an organizational setting, spatial distance could be 
linked to physical proximity (e.g., because of the arrangement of 
offices), while social distance could be connected to hierarchical 
proximity (e.g., the number of hierarchical levels between leaders 
and subordinates) (Napier and Ferris 1993). Temporal distance 
relates to individuals positioning themselves relative to objects 
in the future and/or past, which becomes important in relation 
to leader successions given the temporal divide between former 
and current leaders. Importantly, research shows that different 
distance dimensions “similarly affect prediction, preference, and 
action” (Trope and Liberman 2010, 440). More specifically, a 
larger distance in spatial, social, and temporal terms entails that 
subordinates have less contact with their leader (Gumusluoglu, 
Karakitapoğlu-Aygün, and Hirst 2013; Howell, Neufeld, and 
Avolio 2005; Murdoch and Trondal 2013). It might also reduce the 
quality of their communication (Avolio et al. 2004) and leaders’ 
communication effectiveness (Kelloway et al. 2003; see, however, 
Neufeld, Wan, and Fang 2010). Furthermore, a larger distance 
limits leaders’ ability to convey expectations and coach followers 
(Gittell 2001; Howell, Neufeld, and Avolio 2005) and increases 
the difficulty of monitoring compliance with directives and 
organizational role requirements (Moon and Park 2019; Podsakoff 
et al. 1984).
Overall, reduced leader-subordinate interaction frequency due to 
increased spatial, social, and temporal distances makes it harder for 
leaders to influence subordinates (Bass 1990; Moon and Park 2019; 
Neufeld, Wan, and Fang 2010). Applied to our setting, this leads 
to the prediction that leader succession at a larger spatial and social 
distance has less salience to subordinates and provokes less impact 
on their attitudes.2
Hypothesis 2: Larger distance between leaders and 
subordinates weakens the effect of leader succession on staff 
members’ expressed attitudes with respect to an organization’s 
core values.
A second moderating factor concerns the status of the new leader as 
an “outsider” or “insider.” This multidimensional concept often is 
linked to individuals’ time in the organization as well as differences 
or similarities with other organization members (Giambatista, 
Rowe, and Riaz 2005; Schepker et al. 2017). Insider/outsider 
status matters for the implications of top leader succession because 
leadership is “enacted in the context of a shared group membership” 
(van Knippenberg 2011, 1078). For instance, top leaders who are 
representative of an organization’s identity (i.e., “prototypical of 
the group”; van Knippenberg and Hogg 2003, 243) are generally 
perceived as more effective leaders by subordinates, and they have 
been linked to better performance and higher job satisfaction 
(Cicero, Pierro, and van Knippenberg 2007; Pierro et al. 2005). 
In sharp contrast, out-group leaders “introduce discontinuity of 
identity, and as a result may be particularly likely to elicit resistance” 
(van Knippenberg and Hogg 2003, 278). Consequently, we expect 
insider or in-group leader succession to induce weaker changes in 
subordinates’ attitudes compared with outsider or out-group leader 
succession.
A similar proposition is supported by the idea that outsiders’ distinct 
background and characteristics can cause feelings of incongruence 
within subordinates. Outsiders often bring new perspectives and are 
not committed to “established strategies and policies” (Kunisch et 
al. 2017, 1,015). The resulting feelings of incongruence are known 
to trigger negative emotion (Cast and Burke 2002), which, in turn, 
works to move the parts of self-concept causing these negative 
feelings down the identity hierarchy (Epitropaki et al. 2017). 
Naturally, no similar responses are triggered by—or required for—
insider successions. Outsider succession therefore can be expected to 
induce stronger shifts in subordinates’ attitudes.
Hypothesis 3: Outsider succession triggers stronger changes 
in staff members’ expressed attitudes with respect to an 
organization’s core values.
Two elements require further discussion at this point. First, shifts 
in staff attitudes due to leadership changes are unlikely to be driven 
solely by the identity effects described here. Leadership changes 
might also affect staff ’s incentives to express specific attitudes 
(e.g., because they want to advance in an organization) or alter 
hierarchical constraints on expressing specific attitudes (e.g., because 
leaders employ hierarchical structures to work toward a goal). Both 
alternatives are consistent with the hypotheses derived earlier as 
leadership succession would again translate into attitudinal shifts; 
we return to these mechanisms when discussing our main findings. 
Second, staff attitudes are not determined solely by a single (new) 
leader. Organizational structures and other (past and present) 
leaders likewise play a vital role. Nevertheless, our key argument 
is that new leaders’ rhetoric, actions, and characteristics impact 
staff attitudes at least at the margin. The presence and strength of 




We rely on two rounds of survey data from staff members in a 
large public organization—the European Commission—collected 
in September–November 2008 (N = 1,901; response rate = 13.6 
4 Public Administration Review • xxxx | xxxx 2020
percent) and March–April 2014 (N = 2,209; response rate = 20.8 
percent). The European Commission is of interest for a number 
of reasons. First, it has a strong culture of hierarchical leadership 
(Kassim et al. 2013). The effect of leaders on subordinates thus 
is likely to be strong, which is important from a theoretical 
perspective. Second, the European Commission faces regular 
turnover in both top political (commissioners) and administrative 
(directors-general) leadership positions. While commissioners 
serve fixed five-year terms of office, a principle of rotating senior 
managerial staff, including directors-general, was introduced in 
March 2000. Within our period of observation, all commissioners 
were replaced simultaneously with the change from Barroso I 
to Barroso II in late 2009 (this generally also induced a change 
in the chief of staff, or chef de cabinet). A new director-general 
was appointed in 12 out of 28 directorates-general (DG). This 
creates exploitable variation in terms of which subordinates face 
a leader succession. Importantly, these leadership changes are 
exogenous to the staff members working in the affected directorates 
because employees generally have no input into who becomes a 
commissioner or director-general.
Finally, important for hypothesis 3, the European Commission 
context allows differentiating the effect of insider and outsider 
succession along two dimensions: time in organization and 
contrast with other organization members (Giambatista, Rowe, 
and Riaz 2005, 983). On the one hand, approximately 80 percent 
of directors-general have a long working experience within the 
Commission, whereas recent commissioners have seldom made their 
way through the ranks of the Commission (Ellinas and Suleiman 
2012; Kassim et al. 2013). On the other hand, the different national 
backgrounds of both commissioners and directors-general imply 
that some of these originate from countries more (or less) critical 
toward the Commission’s supranationalism.
Sample and Procedures
Both surveys were conducted by the same research team and 
contain significant overlap in questions relevant to our analysis. 
While stringent anonymity requirements prevented inclusion of 
individual identifiers, we created such identifiers ourselves based 
on a broad range of sociodemographic characteristics (following 
the method pioneered in Murdoch et al. 2019). This indicates 
162 unique respondents present in both samples with the same 
year of birth, sex, nationality (in terms of primary nationality 
and presence of a second nationality), and education (in terms of 
level, field, and international study), year of initial entry in the 
Commission, pre-Commission career history (career type and 
length), and working in the same DG.3 Given the broad range 
of background characteristics and the precise overlap imposed 
on this broad set of characteristics, our identifiers effectively link 
individuals in 2008 to themselves in 2014, thus creating a panel 
data set. Using terminology from matching analysis, our approach 
requires that the “propensity score” accounting for all background 
characteristics approaches 1 for all matches. As a result, we have 
high confidence that it effectively concerns the same respondent 
at both points in time. This is confirmed by the fact that we never 
find more than one individual with the same 11 characteristics 
across both samples (more details on our data set creation and 
its validity are provided in appendix S1 in the Supporting 
Information online).
Table A.1 in appendix S1 shows descriptive statistics for these 
162 respondents, which constitute approximately 9 percent of 
the sample from the first survey wave. This table also verifies the 
representativeness of our sample using t-tests on respondents from 
the original surveys included or excluded from our analysis.
Measures
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable measures staff members’ attitude toward 
the European Commission’s supranational identity (Connolly 
and Kassim 2017; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012; Hooghe 2005). 
We operationalize this using two statements about where power 
should reside in the European Union (EU): (1) “The College of 
Commissioners should become the government of the European 
Union” and (2) “The member states—not the Commission 
or European Parliament—should be the central players in the 
European Union.” Responses were recorded on a 5-point scale 
ranging from (1) “strongly agree” to (5) “strongly disagree.” We 
reverse the coding for the first proposition to obtain a scale in 
which higher numbers reflect support for a supranational power 
orientation in the EU. Respondents’ answers on both propositions 
are averaged throughout the analysis (henceforth referred to as the 
variable “European Commission role in Europe”).
Independent Variable. The European Commission is structured 
along a number of policy domains addressed by DGs with a 
political leader (commissioner) and an administrative manager 
(director-general). Leader succession is operationalized as a change 
in either the commissioner or director-general within a DG during 
our period of observation. A complete overview of all relevant 
leadership changes is included in section B of appendix S1.
Moderator Variables. Our first moderator relates to the social and 
spatial distance between leaders and subordinates. We operationalize 
the joint effect of both these distance dimensions using respondents’ 
contact frequency with their leader using the question: “In order to 
get your job done, how frequently are you in contact with [your 
commissioner]?”4 Answer options were daily, weekly, monthly, 
several times a year, yearly, and never. The last two responses are 
recoded as “infrequent” contact, while all others are recoded as 
“frequent” contact. Still, we show that our results are robust to 
alternative operationalizations of contact frequency. It should also be 
noted that the close cognitive relation between all psychological 
distance dimensions (Trope and Liberman 2010) validates our use 
of one proxy for multiple dimensions. Clearly, however, this implies 
that we cannot disentangle the effects of social and spatial distance 
dimensions in our analysis.
Our second moderator is outsider succession, which we 
operationalize in two ways. The first exploits incoming leaders’ 
perceived value incongruence with outgoing leaders regarding the 
supranational identity of the European Commission (Giambatista, 
Rowe, and Riaz 2005). To capture this, we define a variable 
“change” equal to −1 for respondents in DGs in which the 
commissioner/director-general in 2014 came from an EU-critical 
country, while this was not the case in 2008. It is coded 1 if the 
commissioner/director-general in 2008 came from an EU-critical 
country, while this was not the case in 2014 (and 0 in all other 
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instances). We thereby employ two distinct sources to define a 
country as critical toward the EU. The first follows Murdoch, 
Trondal, and Geys’s (2016) use of the Eurobarometer question “For 
each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be 
made by the national government [coded 1], or made jointly within 
the European Union [coded 2]?” (Eurobarometer 67.2 from 2007). 
The question covers 18 policy areas linked to seven policy clusters 
(e.g., external relations, social regulation, and economic policy), 
which allows defining an indicator variable equal to 1 if the share 
of a country’s population opposing EU-level decision-making in at 
least one policy cluster lies more than one standard deviation above 
the EU27 average in that cluster.
The second source is Gravier and Roth’s (2020, 16) study of 
bureaucratic representation in the European Commission, which 
interprets persistent underrepresentation of staff from a member 
state as reflective of “a rejection either of the EU as a whole or of the 
Commission in particular.” Both sources allow us to develop a list 
of countries that are EU-critical—either linked to their populations’ 
aversion to EU-level decision-making or linked to their lack of 
desire to fill national staff “quota” within the Commission. The 
two resulting country lists show substantial overlap and lead us to 
designate Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom as critical toward the EU.5
The second operationalization of insider versus outsider succession 
differentiates between changes in top political (commissioners) 
and administrative (directors-general) successions. Commissioners 
are nominated by EU member states (one per member state), 
evaluated by the European Parliament, and formally appointed by 
the Council of the European Union (which consists of EU member 
states’ leaders). Hence, member states play a dominant role in this 
process, and commissioners mostly are appointed from outside the 
commission. In sharp contrast, the nomination and appointment 
process for directors-general is internal to the Commission and 
strongly characterized by promotion from within the organization.6 
Still, this second operationalization may be confounded by a pure 
positional effect since leaders’ hierarchical position in our setting 
cannot be isolated from their outsider status.
Empirical Strategy
Our analysis rests on a difference-in-differences identification 
strategy comparing staff members’ attitudes in DGs with 
particular leadership changes (i.e., the first difference between 
“treatment” and “control” groups) before/after these changes 
took place (i.e., the second, temporal difference). A graphical 
representation is provided in figure 1, which clarifies how this 
research design directly controls for preexisting level differences 
across the control and treatment groups (such as respondents’ 
initial attitudes) and general time trends.
More formally, with subscript i representing individual respondents 
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where Wave2014t is 1 for responses in the 2014 survey (0 for responses 
in 2008), and Changei is as defined in the previous section. The 
interaction between the two variables is our variable of interest. Its 
coefficient (β3) captures whether individuals experiencing a particular 
leadership change develop differently between the first and second 
survey compared with individuals experiencing no such leadership 
change. Equation 1 includes a full set of respondent fixed effects (αi). 
These capture all time-invariant aspects of respondents and imply that 
we derive our inferences exclusively from variation over time within the 
same respondent (thereby also controlling for their initial attitudes).7 
Finally, we cluster standard errors at the level of our observations (i.e., 
individual respondents) to avoid biased inferences. Clustering instead 
at the level where leadership changes occur (i.e., DGs) strengthens our 
findings, such that we report on the most conservative approach.
For the interpretation of our results, it is important to note that 
while leader succession is a constant for all respondents witnessing 
leadership transition, these respondents still differ in the nature of 
that transition to/from different types of leaders. Our difference-in-
differences specification exploits this to identify the “leader” effect 
(captured by the interaction term) independent of the “transition” 
effect (captured by the respondent fixed effects).
Remember also that our analysis is restricted to individuals who 
worked in the same DG during both survey waves (see note 3). This 
induces two potential concerns. On the one hand, civil servants 
who did not move to another DG may not be a random sample of 
European Commission staff. While we cannot rule this out, it only 
affects our ability to generalize beyond this subsample and not the 
internal validity of the research design. Indeed, equation 1 can still 
identify the local average treatment effect of leadership succession 
conditional on staff members’ employment stability within the same 
DG. On the other hand, we cannot observe why individuals did not 
move. One might worry that these motives—such as affect or lack 
of alternatives—also influence individuals’ attitudes over time. Our 
respondent fixed effects control for this potential confound as long 
as respondents’ motives do not change over time (otherwise, we 
would require that changes in nonmobility motives be uncorrelated 
with specific types of leadership changes).
Results
Our main findings are summarized in table 1, which consists of 
two panels. The top panel looks at the overall effects of leadership 
succession, and the bottom panel differentiates between the 
succession of leaders with perceived views closer to, or further from, 
the supranational identity of the European Commission.
Column 1 in the top panel of table 1 shows a positive relationship 
between leadership succession in top political positions of the Figure 1 Graphical Illustration of Empirical Method
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European Commission and the attitudes of staff members working 
in the affected DGs. This general effect just fails to reach statistical 
significance at conventional levels,8 but it hides considerable 
heterogeneity in the observed effect. Indeed, columns 2 and 
3 indicate a substantively and statistically stronger impact for 
respondents in frequent contact with their commissioner (i.e., at 
least several times a year). The difference between the interaction 
term coefficients in both columns is statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p < .01 in all cases). This supports hypothesis 
2, which states that leader succession has stronger effects when 
leader-subordinate distance is smaller. Given our coding of Changei, 
the positive point estimate for individuals in frequent contact with 
their leaders implies that appointing a commissioner from a more 
EU-critical country than the previous leader (i.e., out-group leader 
succession) causes a decline in staff ’s stated supranational attitudes, 
and vice versa for in-group leader succession. These directional 
effects support the moderating role of value incongruence between 
incoming and outgoing commissioners (hypothesis 3).
Interestingly, column 4 shows a very weakly negative point estimate 
for leader successions involving the director-general (remember 
that we lack contact data for this type of leader). One possible 
explanation for the difference with column 1—consistent with 
hypothesis 3—is that most appointed directors-general already 
had a long career within the European Commission, where staff 
regulations require that they act in the interests of the EU. As 
such, they are generally considered insiders, and staff members 
may perceive little difference between incoming and outgoing 
directors-general (Kassim et al. 2013). Although these results may 
be confounded by a purely positional effect, they suggest that the 
combination of both dimensions of “outsiderness”—that is, arrival 
from outside the Commission and perceived value incongruence 
between incoming and outgoing leaders—drives our results.
Finally, the bottom panel of table 1 suggests that there are no 
consistent or statistically significant differences linked to the 
exit of commissioners from more EU-critical countries and the 
appointment of commissioners from more EU-critical countries. 
F-tests indicate that both point estimates—in columns 1, 2, and 
3—are never significantly different from each other in absolute 
terms.
Overall, our findings are consistent with a theoretical framework 
in which the succession of close (but not distant) leaders activates 
different aspects of subordinates’ self-concepts, which then triggers 
changes in staff ’s stated attitudes about the organization’s core 
values. Clearly, however, our analysis cannot exclude the possibility 
that rational staff members strategically express specific attitudes 
to achieve a higher standing and/or influence with the new leader. 
Although such “impression management” (Goffman 1959, 238) 
remains consistent with new leaders’ impact on subordinates’ self-
concept (as it requires adaptation of one’s “mental model” of the 
self ), differentiating both mechanisms empirically would entail 
in-depth research on the same individuals under multiple leader 
successions.
Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check, we replicate the analysis with an 
alternative operationalization of staff members’ supranational 
attitudes. We thereby look at respondents’ views on whether 
decision-making authority within a given policy field should be 
located with the European Commission rather than national 
governments (Murdoch, Connolly, and Kassim 2018). The question 
reads, “We are interested in your views on the distribution of 
authority between member states and the EU on a range of policies. 
Where should this policy be decided?” This question was asked 
for “agriculture,” “competition,” “environment,” “foreign and 





All Perfect Matches (1) Frequent Contact (2) Infrequent Contact (3) All Perfect Matches (4)
Leader change - - - -
Wave2014 0.067 (0.92) 0.070 0.014 0.066
(0.71) (0.15) (0.94)
Leader change * Wave2014 0.212 (1.33) 0.597 *** −0.214 −0.115
(3.18) (−0.96) (−0.61)
N 317 126 191 317
R2 0.024 0.203 0.013 0.011
Leader change FROM EU-critical country — — — —
Leader change TO EU-critical country — — — —
Wave2014 0.041 (0.52) 0.113 (0.99) 0.000 (0.00) 0.061 (0.81)
Leader change FROM EU-critical country * Wave2014 0.293 (1.54) 0.505 ** (2.05) −0.150 (−0.63) −0.061 (−0.20)
Leader change TO EU-critical country * Wave2014 −0.099 (−0.33) −0.779 ** (−2.22) 0.272 0.131 (0.56)
N 317 126 191 317
R2 0.027 0.208 0.014 0.012
Notes: The dependent variable is “European Commission role in Europe,” which represents respondents’ views about the College of Commissioners—rather than 
the member states or the European Parliament—being the key player in the EU. Answers are recorded on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly agree”) to 5 (“strongly 
disagree”). “Leader change” equals −1 for respondents in DGs in which the top political (commissioner) or administrative (director-general) leader in 2014 came from 
an EU-critical country, while this was not the case in 2008. It is coded 1 if the top political or administrative leader in 2008 came from an EU-critical country, while this 
was not the case in 2014 (and 0 in all other instances). “Wave2014” is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the second wave of the survey in 2014 (0 for the first wave in 
2008). “Leader change TO EU-critical country” equals 1 for respondents in DGs in which the top political or administrative leader in 2014 came from an EU-critical coun-
try, while this was not the case in 2008. “Leader change FROM EU-critical country” equals 1 for respondents in DGs in which the top political or administrative leader in 
2008 came from an EU-critical country, while this was not the case in 2014. “Frequent contact” refers to respondents who are in contact with the commissioner of their 
DG more than once a year (0 otherwise), while less frequent contact is defined as “infrequent contact.” The t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors between brackets.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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security,” and “asylum and immigration” policies, and responses 
were recorded on an 11-point scale ranging from 0, “exclusively 
national/subnational,” to 10, “exclusively EU.” Our main findings 
are confirmed when using this alternative dependent variable (see 
table A.3 in appendix S1).
As a second robustness check, we include information about 
changes in commissioners’ chef de cabinet, who plays a key role 
in DGs’ internal functioning (Kassim et al. 2013). The results 
are similar to those reported for commissioners in table 1. This 
reflects that commissioners often select a chef de cabinet from a 
similar background and suggests there is no additional effect on 
staff attitudes from changing both the commissioner and the chef 
de cabinet (see table A.4 in appendix S1). Unfortunately, there are 
only a few cases in which individuals witness a change in both the 
commissioner and the director-general. Therefore, we cannot assess 
any additive effects of such joint leadership changes, which we 
consider an important avenue for future research.
A third robustness check replicates the analysis using the original 
answer options for our measure of contact frequency. While this 
imposes a linear development in the effect of contact frequency, it 
again leaves our main findings unaffected (table A.5. in appendix 
S1).
Discussion
Our analysis contributes to arguably the largest question in private 
and public sector leadership: do leaders matter? Leadership has 
frequently been linked to organizational performance (Javidan and 
Waldman 2003; Jacobsen and Andersen 2015). We argue that such 
effects arise in part because leaders have substantial implications in 
terms of staff members’ attitudes toward their organization and its 
core values. This constitutes an important theoretical contribution 
to the public sector leadership literature, which has thus far largely 
ignored subordinates’ attitudinal responses to leadership changes. 
Our empirical results confirm this individual-level impact of top 
leader successions, and show that it occurs particularly for outsider 
succession and when subordinates frequently interact with leaders.
Our analysis furthermore suggests that new leaders are equally prone 
to induce shifts toward and at odds with those of the organization 
(bottom panel of table 1). This has considerable implications for 
organizations intending to shift course as part of organizational 
change processes. Indeed, our findings imply that replacing 
top leaders with individuals incorporating desired future values 
would be equally effective as a change strategy than appointing 
leaders embodying current values. This contradicts insights from 
transference theory (Andersen and Chen 2002; Hinkley and 
Andersen 1996), which suggest that appointing “new leaders 
who are similar to prior leaders” undermines intended changes in 
organizational culture “because they may elicit similar expectations 
and self-regulatory structures in subordinates” (Ritter and Lord 
2007, 1693). We consider the further elucidation of this debate a 
crucial issue for future work (see also van Knippenberg and Hogg 
2003).
Our study also has limitations that indicate additional avenues 
for further research. One limitation is that our analysis could only 
rely on a limited number of individuals observed at two points 
in time. While our empirical design allowed capturing the causal 
effect of top leader succession on follower attitudes, the limited 
time series precludes a more in-depth analysis of the exact timing 
of these effects. Exploring such timing effects would increase 
our understanding of the role of temporal distance in leadership 
succession. For instance, how long after a leadership succession 
do follower attitudes start to shift, what is the rate of change in 
attitudes, and how can the speed and extent of this change be 
influenced by leaders? More extensive longitudinal studies on larger 
samples are required to address these questions.
Second, our results show clear changes in subordinates’ expressed 
attitudes sparked by top leader succession under specific 
conditions. Yet such shifts in attitudes provide no guarantee that 
this subsequently translates into actions and contributions to 
implementing leaders’ preferences in specific policy dossiers. Policy-
related effects are naturally hard to quantify whenever individual 
staff members’ actions and contributions are difficult to observe. 
Even so, this constitutes an important avenue for further research 
since leadership changes are generally also about changes in policy 
priorities, instruments, and goals.
Third, while subordinates in our setting on average display more 
signs of alignment than contrast effects, our data do not allow us to 
study their respective roles more explicitly at the individual level. 
From a theoretical perspective, however, our line of argument 
entails that individual-level effects of leader succession would 
differ across staff members with better/worse relationships with the 
outgoing leader and higher/lower predisposition toward ingratiating 
behaviors. Empirical validation of these propositions might be 
feasible in future work using experimental research designs.
Fourth, other moderators than the ones included in our analysis 
should be analyzed. For instance, top leader successions in our 
setting are part of a well-known and predictable rotation system. 
Given the diverging characteristics and implications of different 
succession processes (e.g., executive relay with preparation of an 
heir apparent or horse race with several candidates pitted against 
each other), one could evaluate whether, and to what extent, the 
type of leader selection process moderates the influence of top 
leader succession. Similarly, the European Commission’s leadership 
rotation scheme provides no variation in the context for leader 
succession. In other settings, leader succession often takes place in 
different circumstances—such as good or poor performance. Again, 
these circumstances may condition the influence of top leader 
succession on subordinates’ attitudes.
Finally, our analysis concentrates on an international organization 
with a multinational leadership. National backgrounds and 
identities are a very prominent feature of leaders in this setting. 
Similar effects might, however, also arise in other contexts related 
to other prominent features of leadership figures. This opens the 
door toward the analytical generalization of our argument in other 
contexts. For instance, within a national setting, ministers’ party 
affiliation is an important identifier that is linked to different ideas 
about specific public policies. Hence, our theoretical framework 
would predict an observable impact of a leadership change involving 
a shift in party upon national civil servants’ attitudes within that 
ministry.
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Conclusion
This study argued that top leader succession can activate different 
aspects of subordinates’ self-concept, and thereby change their 
attitudes toward organizational values. Our empirical findings 
corroborate that this arises particularly when the new leader is an 
outsider and when subordinates have more frequent contact with 
their leader. These findings not only broaden our understanding of 
the consequences of top leader succession, but also draw attention 
to one potential mechanism driving previously studied leadership 
effects on organizational performance (Javidan and Waldman 2003; 
Jacobsen and Andersen 2015).
This analysis carries significant practical implications for 
organizational change processes involving the appointment of new 
leaders. A first implication relates to the importance of succession 
planning. Our findings suggest that public sector organizations should 
pay close attention to the backgrounds of leadership candidates—
and how they relate to those of the organization and outgoing 
leaders (Ritter and Lord 2007; van Knippenberg and Hogg 2003). 
Factors such as the “outsiderness” of candidates can have important 
consequences for the effect of top leader succession on staff members’ 
attitudes. Our findings also reaffirm Zhao et al.’s (2016, 1736) 
argument that organizations can benefit from making salient “the 
contrast between a team’s current leader and its former leader.” Zhao 
et al. stress the relevance of such strategy “when the new leader is 
more transformational than the former.” (1736). Our study indicates 
it might also be beneficial when the incoming leader is likely to be 
perceived by staff members as a closer match to the organization’s 
core values than the outgoing leader (i.e., shows a higher level of 
group prototypicality; see van Knippenberg and Hogg 2003). A 
second practical implication thus is that public organizations should 
invest in verbal and nonverbal messages toward staff to increase the 
salience of positive differences—and decrease the salience of negative 
differences—between incoming and outgoing leaders.
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Notes
1 Other moderators are conceivable, including the leader selection process (e.g., 
executive relay or horse race), the context for leader succession, or the nature of a 
subordinate’s relationship with the outgoing leader. Our focus was driven by 
both theoretical relevance and data availability (e.g., there is no variation in 
leader selection processes in our data or information about the nature of a 
subordinate’s relationship with the outgoing leader). We return to alternative 
moderators in the discussion of our results.
2 Temporal distance may also matter, particularly in terms of the timing of any 
attitudinal effects. Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to explore this 
proposition, such that we give less attention to it here. We return to this 
temporal dimension in the discussion of our results.
3 We exclude individuals moving DGs between both survey waves for two reasons. 
First, such moves may be a choice by the staff member (which introduces 
self-selection concerns) and might contaminate our results with other workplace-
related effects. Second, it is difficult to ascertain whether it really concerns the 
same individual in both survey rounds. We return to the potential implications 
of this sample restriction later.
4 Unfortunately, we only have this information about commissioners since the 
survey did not include an equivalent question about directors-general.
5 This operationalization implicitly assumes that individual leaders are perceived by 
their staff to share, at least to some extent, the attitudes toward the European 
Union that are prevalent within their member state. While such national influences 
are not undisputed in the academic literature (e.g., Egeberg 2012; Suvarierol 
2008), top European Commission officials’ appointments (Wonka 2007), position 
taking (van Esch and de Jong 2019; Wonka 2008, 2015), and attitudes (Hooghe 
1999, 435) have at times been found to remain “greatly influenced by prior state 
career and previous [home country] political socialization.”
6 Many commissioners have experience as ministers in their home country prior to 
their European appointment and thereby have been part of decision-making 
processes within the Council of the European Union. While this provides 
experience with the European institutions, participation in these processes as 
national minister entails defending national rather than supranational interests 
(Arregui and Thomson 2014; Mühlböck and Tosun 2018). As such, 
commissioners with ministerial experience remain much more outsiders than 
insiders.
7 Note that Changei is a time-invariant variable reflecting whether an individual 
was “treated” with a particular type of leadership change. The individual fixed 
effects therefore are perfectly collinear with Changei. Hence, this variable drops 
out of the final regression equation.
8 Although commissioners are always proposed by the member states, reappointed 
commissioners might constitute a special case because of their Commission 
experience. Hence, we replicated our analysis excluding the eight (out of 24) 
commissioners who were reappointed from Barroso I to Barroso II. This leaves 
our main findings qualitatively unaffected, but, if anything, marginally 
strengthens them by making the key interaction term in column (1) statistically 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level (see table A.2 in appendix S1).
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